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Abstract
We extend two kinds of causal models,
structural equation models and simula-
tion models, to infinite variable spaces.
This enables a semantics for condition-
als founded on a calculus of interven-
tion, and axiomatization of causal reason-
ing for rich, expressive generative models—
including those in which a causal represen-
tation exists only implicitly—in an open-
universe setting. Further, we show that
under suitable restrictions the two kinds of
models are equivalent, perhaps surprisingly
as their axiomatizations differ substantially
in the general case. We give a series of com-
plete axiomatizations in which the open-
universe nature of the setting is seen to be
essential.
1 Introduction
A hallmark of intelligence is the ability to reason
about cause and effect. Indeed, some form of causal
representation is essential for robust reasoning un-
der uncertainty, including flexible planning, deliver-
ing useful explanations, and the capacity to trans-
fer knowledge from one domain to another. How
should causal knowledge be represented? Extant
formalisms vary widely both in terms of their rep-
resentational primitives and in the reasoning prin-
ciples they engender, witness frameworks based on
similarity-orderings (Lewis, 1973; Ginsberg, 1986),
Bayesian networks, and structural equation mod-
els (Spirtes et al., 2000; Pearl, 2009), among oth-
ers. While distinct and sometimes even incompatible
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(see, e.g., Halpern 2013; Zhang 2013 on similarity-
orderings versus structural equation models, and
Pearl 2009; Bottou et al. 2013 on Bayes nets ver-
sus structural equation models), each of these frame-
works captures important insights about causal rep-
resentation and reasoning.
A second hallmark of uncertain reasoning is the abil-
ity to deal with “open-universe” or “first-order” do-
mains in a way that does not assume a fixed, fi-
nite set of variables. Milch et al. (2005) present
an illustrative example of aircrafts producing iden-
tical blips on a radar screen. The radar blips
give a noisy picture of the positions and veloci-
ties of some antecedently unknown number of air-
crafts. Reasoning about evident in this setting in-
troduces distinct challenges, chiefly to encode ev-
idence about objects one did not know existed.
Observing N blips, for example, is still consis-
tent with any number of latent aircrafts. The
field of statistical relational modeling has developed
sophisticated methods for learning and reasoning
in such domains (Poole, 2003; Milch et al., 2005;
Carbonetto et al., 2005; Richardson and Domingos,
2006; Srivastava et al., 2014; Gogate and Domingos,
2016).
Research on these two aspects of uncertain reason-
ing has proceeded mostly independently. Whereas
similarity-based causal representations in principle
extend to first-order settings (e.g., Friedman et al.
2000), and there have been numerous extensions
of directed graphical models to handle unbounded
numbers of variables (e.g., Friedman et al. 1998;
Pfeffer and Koller 2000), models with a perspicu-
ous and useful causal interpretation typically as-
sume a fixed, finite set of variables. That is, al-
though in the course of learning one may always
infer the existence of new hidden variables, no in-
ferred causal model would typically employ an un-
bounded set of variables. Theoretical work on
causal representation nearly always assumes this
restriction (Galles and Pearl, 1998; Halpern, 2000;
Spirtes et al., 2000; Zhang, 2013; Pearl, 2009).
Such a restriction is undoubtedly appropriate for
many applications. But it may also be limitative.
Returning to the radar blip example, for instance,
we should be able to assess such claims as, “if there
were more than 100 aircrafts, at least one would be
missed by the radar,” or “given the observed blips,
had there been five more aircrafts, at least two would
have been dangerously close to one another,” and
so on. These are essentially first-order queries that
depend on complex causal facts about an unknown
number of entities and their properties and relations.
Such causal queries ought to be answerable from a
single underlying model (possibly under different ob-
servations), without having to specify a distinct set
of variables for each use.
One promising approach to this problem comes
from a tradition broadly within statistical relational
modeling, whereby knowledge is encoded in the
form of generative probabilistic programs. Proba-
bilistic programs can be used as stochastic simula-
tors and inverted to perform conditional inference
given observational data, capturing an important
variety of probabilisitic learning (Milch et al., 2005;
Goodman et al., 2008; de Raedt and Kimmig, 2015;
Tran et al., 2017; Bingham et al., 2019). Encoding
a generative process implicitly as a program facili-
tates succinct representation of complex dependen-
cies among unbounded sets of variables.
Similarly, within research on neural networks, so
called implicit generative models—tools such as
variational autoencoders and generative adversarial
networks—also represent probability distributions
implicitly by means of stochastic data simulators
(Mohamed and Lakshminarayanan, 2017). Though
these models are typically incapable of dealing with
fully open-universe domains, extensions may in prin-
ciple be expressive enough to do so (see, e.g., Li et al.
2017). Related ideas involving “mental simulation”
of environmental dynamics are being increasingly
explored within neural approaches to reinforcement
learning (Hamrick, 2019).
Probabilistic generative models are often associ-
ated with an intuitive causal interpretation, al-
though this interpretation is not always appropriate
(Peters et al., 2017). For example, there should be a
reason for thinking that parameters of the model cor-
respond appropriately to aspects of the true underly-
ing data-generating process (Besserve et al., 2018).
Our interest here is in a more abstract question:
what structural features would be sufficient in order
for an open-universe model even to be a candidate
as a causal model?
Our aim in this paper is to establish formal (ax-
iomatic) foundations for genuinely open-universe
causal models. Specifically, we want to under-
stand and assess the subjunctive conditional claims
they encode. Subjunctive conditionals—“what if?”
statements about what would occur under coun-
terfactual or hypothetical conditions—are of foun-
dational importance for causal reasoning, arguably
definitional of the subject matter (Spirtes et al.,
2000; Pearl, 2009; Bottou et al., 2013; Peters et al.,
2017). Such conditional statements are typically
formalized by appeal to a notion of causal in-
tervention (Meek and Glymour, 1994; Spirtes et al.,
2000; Pearl, 2009), and axioms for conditionals
play crucially into prominent algorithms for in-
ferring counterfactual and interventional proba-
bilities (“causal effects”) from observational data
(Shpitser and Pearl, 2008; Pearl and Bareinboim,
2012; Hyttinen et al., 2015).
Open-universe models can be specified either im-
plicitly via a (data-generating) program or pro-
cess, or explicitly via a set of equations relat-
ing the variables. In general these two kinds of
models—together with natural corresponding con-
cepts of hypothetical/counterfactual intervention—
are quite different, both conceptually and axiomati-
cally (Ibeling and Icard, 2018). For instance, they
handle loops and feedback in incompatible ways
(cf. also Lauritzen and Richardson 2002). Nonethe-
less, we show that under suitable restrictions, well-
motivated from a causal perspective, the two are ex-
pressively equivalent. Thus, our first contribution is
to define two natural classes of simulation programs
and structural equation models, respectively, and
show equivalence of these two classes with respect
to the conditional claims they entail. The charac-
terizations appeal to an implicit (discrete) temporal
structure, and can be seen as “open-universe data-
generating processes” generalizing the idea of a “re-
cursive” causal model in the sense of Pearl (2009),
viewed either procedurally or declaratively. We of-
fer this as a formalization of those generative models
that could plausibly be interpreted as causal models.
Following this we establish a series of axiomatiza-
tion results with respect to natural systems for rea-
soning about subjunctive conditionals. Our results
build on previous axiomatic work on causal con-
ditionals that assumed a fixed, finite set of vari-
ables (Galles and Pearl, 1998; Halpern, 1998, 2000),
extending this work to the open-universe setting.
Dealing with an unbounded set of variables presents
unique challenges. Nevertheless, we show that an ax-
iomatic system including quintessential causal prin-
ciples (including those used in aforementioned iden-
tifiability algorithms) is sound and complete for both
the procedural and the declarative classes of models,
thereby substantiating the causal interpretation of
both classes.
Bringing out the open-universe aspect of these mod-
els, we consider augmenting the conditional lan-
guage with a causal influence relation  , whereby
X  Y expresses that there is a context in
which a change in X would lead to a change in Y
(Woodward, 2003; Pearl, 2009). Whereas this rela-
tion is easily definable in the finite setting (Halpern,
1998), in our setting  is an essentially higher-
order notion, quantifying over all possible interven-
tions. Reasoning about this relation in any par-
ticular model—most notably in rich probabilistic
programs—may in general be undecidable; however,
the satisfiability problem for all the systems we con-
sider remains NP-complete, showing that abstract
causal reasoning (e.g., as features in the do-calculus)
in the open-universe setting is no more complex than
in the finite setting.
Finally, as an additional application of this study, we
consider the special case where all causal influence is
local, in the sense that whenever X  Y , this influ-
ence is mediated by variables temporally in between
X and Y . As we explain, this semantic assumption
is quite natural in the open-universe setting, and ax-
iomatically it corresponds exactly to the claim that
 is a transitive relation.
The broader goal of this work is to establish founda-
tions suitable for understanding and assessing highly
expressive (open-universe) representational systems
that encode causal structure, even if only implicitly.
Such models feature not only in recent AI research,
but also centrally in models of human cognition (see,
e.g., Freer et al. 2012; Lake et al. 2017). Indeed, the
open-universe nature of human reasoning under un-
certainty is well-established (Kemp, 2012). We may
thus expect that, however causal knowledge is rep-
resented in humans, it accommodates flexible, open-
universe reasoning. At a high level, the present
work brings together research on causal represen-
tation and reasoning with ideas and tools from sta-
tistical relational modeling and higher-order repre-
sentation.
2 Two Classes of Models
In this section we introduce two kinds of models, one
based on systems of equations (§2.1), the other based
on algorithms (§2.2). They respectively emphasize
declarative and procedural styles of modeling. Ow-
ing in part to this difference, the most general ver-
sions of the two can be distinguished even at a very
abstract, axiomatic level (Ibeling and Icard, 2018).
However, by restricting to appropriate (causally mo-
tivated) subclasses, we can demonstrate their equiv-
alence (Thm. 1).
Throughout this section we assume a signature
(χ,Σ), specifying a countably infinite set χ of vari-
ables that take on values from a set Σ. For exam-
ple, we might have a variable in χ representing “the
position of the 77th aircraft,” which could take on
values in some numerical range (or a special value
“undefined” if there is no 77th aircraft). Even if
we restrict each variable to take only finitely many
possible values, the fact that χ is infinite allows en-
coding arbitrarily complex structures.
2.1 Structural Equation Models
The most general class of structural equations mod-
els (see, e.g., Pearl 2009) allows arbitrary equations
among arbitrary sets of variables. Because our pri-
mary interest here is in (open-universe, probabilis-
tic) generative models, we restrict attention to a
special subclass of possible sets of equations. First,
we assume an infinite set of variables χ. Second,
similar to so called recursive models (Pearl, 2009),
we will assume that variables can be given a causal
(intuitively, temporal) order. Although there may
well be adequate causal interpretations of nonrecur-
sive models, e.g., as descriptions of equilibrium be-
havior of some underlying process (Strotz and Wold,
1960), these interpretations rely on the declara-
tive character of equational modeling and cannot
always be adequately captured by an appropriate
data-generating process (Lauritzen and Richardson,
2002).
Third, unlike in dynamic Bayesian net-
works and related extended graphical models
(Dean and Kanazawa, 1989; Friedman et al., 1998),
we do not require each variable to depend on only
finitely many others; a variable may depend on an
unbounded number of variables preceding it in a
temporal order. Fourth, we require all equations to
be uniformly computable (Defn. 4).
Note, finally, that we make no use here of the distinc-
tion between exogenous and endogenous variables
(though see the discussion in §2.3 below).
Definition 1 (Structural Equation Model). A
structural equation model (SEM) is a collection of
partial functions {fX}X∈χ, with fX : (χ→ Σ)→ Σ,
and a time map t : χ → N. Each fX is a function
only of preceding variables: if v, v′ ∈ dom(fX) and
v(X ′) = v′(X ′) for all X ′ such that t(X ′) < t(X),
then fX(v) = fX(v
′).
The functions in an SEM specify structural equa-
tions {X = fX(·)}X∈χ that are to be simultane-
ously satisfied: an SEM M has solution v : χ → Σ
if fX(v) = v(X) for all X . We write M |= v in
this case. Since the order t is well-founded and
acyclic, v may be built up iteratively, and is thus
unique. Intervention on an SEM is defined stan-
dardly (Meek and Glymour, 1994; Pearl, 2009):
Definition 2 (Intervention on an SEM). An inter-
vention is a partial function i : χ → Σ. It specifies
variables dom(i) ⊆ χ to be held fixed, and the val-
ues to which they are fixed. Intervention i induces a
mapping of SEMs, also denoted i, as follows. Abbre-
viate X ∈ dom(i) as X ∈ i. Then i(M) is identical
toM , but with fX replaced by the constant function
fX(·) = i(X) for each X ∈ i.
Given i, i′ we say i is a restriction of i′ if dom(i) ⊆
dom(i′) and i(X) = i′(X) for all X ∈ i. Note i′ may
be a total function v : χ → Σ. We define a natural
relation of causal influence in SEMs as follows (after
Woodward 2003; Pearl 2009).
Definition 3 (Causal influence). Let X,Y ∈ χ with
X 6= Y . Then M |= X  Y (read X influences
Y ) if there is an intervention i (the context) and
x1, x2 ∈ Σ so that, for j = 1, 2 letting ixj be the
intervention fixing X to xj and vj be the solution
ixj(i(M)) |= vj , we have v1(Y ) 6= v2(Y ).
If X  Y then t(X) < t(Y ); this is easy to see again
from the fact that the temporal order implies that a
solution may be assembled iteratively.
For comparison with simulation models, it is help-
ful to identify those SEMs whose (counterfac-
tual) solutions are computable. Similar restrictions
have been explored in the literature, e.g., on ap-
proaches to causal inference based on so called algo-
rithmic independence (Janzing and Scho¨lkopf, 2010;
Peters et al., 2017). This is the subclass in which the
functions {fX}X∈χ are uniformly computable and t
is also computable (both presuming an encoding of
χ):
Definition 4 (Computable Structural Equation
Model). Let M = {fX}X∈χ be an SEM with time
map t, and let F be the set of computable functions
χ→ Σ. We say M is computable if t is computable,
dom(fX) = F for all X , and φ : χ× F → Σ defined
by φ(X, v) = fX(v) is a computable function.
To clarify the sense in which φ is computable, let
us associate each variable in χ with a square of an
infinite Turing machine tape with alphabet Σ. We
call such a tape a variable tape. A variable tape (no
square of which is blank) stores a function χ → Σ.
That φ is computable means that it is computed by
a machine M with two input tapes, the second of
which is a variable tape. When M is run with the
encoding of some X ∈ χ stored on the first tape
and a computable function v : χ→ Σ stored on the
second (variable) tape,M halts outputting the value
φ(X, v). M need not halt given uncomputable input
v.
Let us writeM for the class of all computable SEMs;
clearlyM closes under computable intervention and
every SEM in M has a unique solution.
Let Mlocal be the subclass of M in which every
X ∈ χ only depends on immediately preceding vari-
ables: if v, v′ ∈ dom(fX) and v(X
′) = v′(X ′) for all
X ′ such that t(X ′) = t(X)−1, then fX(v) = fX(v
′).
Causal influence is not transitive in SEMs generally,
but it is transitive in Mlocal (Pearl, 2009). Further-
more, we can prove the following “interpolation” re-
sult:
Proposition 1. Let M ∈ Mlocal and X,Y ∈ χ. If
M |= X  Y and t(Y ) > t(X)+1, there is a variable
X ′ such that M |= X  X ′ and M |= X ′  Y .
Proof. There is a context i and xj , vj for j = 1, 2
such that ixj(i(M)) |= vj and v1(Y ) 6= v2(Y ) (Defn.
3); thus φ(Y, v1) 6= φ(Y, v2) (Defn. 4). Let Sj ⊂ χ
be the set of variables whose squares the computa-
tion of φ(Y, vj) accesses before outputting a value
for Y and halting; crucially Sj is finite. Form inter-
vention ij as the restriction of vj to S1 ∪ S2 and let
uj be the solution ij(M) |= uj . Since M ∈ Mlocal,
uj(Y ) = vj(Y ). Let {Xi}2≤i≤k be those variables
in dom(i1) for which i1(Xi) 6= i2(Xi), and con-
sider a finite sequence {i′n}1≤n≤k where i
′
1 = i1,
and for 2 ≤ n ≤ k, i′n = i
′
n−1 with the sole ex-
ception that i′n(Xn) = i2(Xn). Let {v
′
n}1≤n≤k be
the solutions i′n(M) |= v
′
n. Since i
′
k = i2, we have
v′k(Y ) = u2(Y ) = v2(Y ) 6= v1(Y ) = u1(Y ) =
v′1(Y ); there is thus some m, 2 ≤ m ≤ k for
which v′m(Y ) 6= v
′
m−1(Y ). Then i
′
m−1 witnesses that
M |= X ′m  Y and i1 witnesses thatM |= X  X
′
m
as v1(X
′
m) = i1(X
′
m) 6= i2(X
′
m) = v2(X
′
m).
Taking the temporal interpretation of t seriously,
Prop. 1 reflects the intuition that causal influence is
always mediated through time, essentially enforcing
a kind of Markov assumption.
2.2 Monotone Simulation Models
Our second class of models similarly deals with an
infinite class of variables, but is intended to cap-
ture the procedural character of a simulation pro-
gram, e.g., as defined in an expressive program-
ming language. Such models have been studied in
relative generality by means of (probabilistic) Tur-
ing machines (see, e.g,. Freer et al. 2012 for an
overview), and at this level of generality they can be
shown to validate only a very weak set of conditional
axioms (Ibeling and Icard, 2018), far weaker than
those commonly required of causal conditionals (cf.
§3.2 below). Here we restrict attention to machines
in which the variables can be given a causal order,
again analogously to recursive graphical models. As
simulation programs are intended to capture an un-
derlying data-generating process, this causal order
can be well justified (cf. Lauritzen and Richardson
2002).
Definition 5 (Simulation model). A simulation
model (or just a simulation) is a deterministic Turing
machine with two tapes: a work tape and a variable
tape (see discussion following Defn. 4). The vari-
able tape is write-only: no variable head transitions
in which a symbol of Σ is erased or rewritten are
allowed.
Thanks to the write-only restriction, any variable is
written at most once. Given v : χ → Σ, if every
X is written with the value v(X), v is the solution
of T and we write T |= v. Intervention is defined
via blocking rewrites (Icard, 2017; Ibeling and Icard,
2018):
Definition 6 (Intervention). Given intervention i
and an oracle for i, the simulation i(T) emulates T
but acts as if the square for any X ∈ i is fixed to
the value i(X);1 it dovetails this emulation with a
procedure that writes i(X) to X for all X ∈ i.
In other words, an intervention on a simulation pro-
gram T is an operation on the code of T that holds
1 Formally, suppose at some point in the execution the
next variable tape transition of T is δ(q, s) = (q′, s′, d).
Before simulating this transition i(T) calls the oracle
on X. If X /∈ i then the simulation proceeds unim-
peded: T transitions to state q′, s′ is written to square
X, and the head moves in direction d. If X ∈ i then in-
stead, the simulation does the action (q′′, i(X), d′) where
δ(q, i(X)) = (q′′, s′′, d′).
some set of variables to fixed values, an operation
that will typically have side-effects on other vari-
ables.
A computable intervention is one whose oracle can
be effectively implemented; simulations thus close
under computable intervention. The primary phe-
nomena of interest are the behaviors of a simula-
tion under possible interventions. This motivates an
equivalence notion:
Definition 7. Simulations T,T′ are equivalent, T ≃
T′, if for any computable i and v : χ→ Σ, i(T) |= v
iff i(T′) |= v. They are weakly equivalent if this
property only holds when dom(i) = ∅.
It is immediate that interventions compose: for any
interventions i, i′, there is an intervention i′ ◦ i such
that (i′ ◦ i)(T) ≃ i′(i(T)) for all T. If i, i′ are com-
putable then so is i′ ◦ i.
The mere fact that a variable has been intervened
on may affect a simulation, even if it has been held
fixed to its actual value (Ibeling and Icard, 2018).
This behavior differs starkly from that of SEMs, so
to compare the models we must consider only the
class of simulations in which non-counterfactual in-
terventions are idempotent:
Definition 8. We say T is (strongly) functional if
for any i with i(T) |= v and any restriction i′ of v,
i′(i(T)) and i(T ) are weakly equivalent.
We define the causal influence relation in simula-
tions analogously to Defn. 3. We call a simulation
monotone if it is well-ordered with respect to causal
influence:
Definition 9. A simulation T is monotone if there
is a computable time map t : χ→ N preserving  .
It follows from compositionality of interventions that
if T is monotone under t, then so is i(T) for any i.
Here we consider only simulations that have a solu-
tion under any computable intervention. Let T be
the class of such simulations that are also functional
and monotone.
2.3 Relation to Existing Work
Thm. 1 below shows that the classM of computable
SEMs can essentially be seen as declarative versions
of the class T of generative programs. Both classes
of models naturally accommodate probability. For
SEMs, we simply identify a subset of the variables as
exogenous and associate those variables with an ap-
propriate probability distribution, which in turn in-
duces (conditional and interventional) distributions
on the remaining (“endogenous”) variables (Pearl,
2009). For simulation programs, we simply add
an additional read-only random bit tape whose dis-
tribution induces random behavior in the machine,
which in turn implicitly defines (conditional and in-
terventional) distributions on the variables χ (cf.
Freer et al. 2012). The resulting models encompass
a wide range of familiar and powerful formalisms.
For instance, M clearly incorporates all com-
putable (Defn. 4) and recursive (in the sense
of Pearl 2009) SEMs. Likewise, T certainly
includes Bayesian networks as well as dynamic
Bayesian networks (Dean and Kanazawa, 1989), in
addition to standard dynamic programming al-
gorithms and feedforward neural networks. But
crucially, T also encompasses programs in which
variables may depend on infinitely many oth-
ers, such as those defined in common proba-
bilistic programming languages (Milch et al., 2005;
Goodman et al., 2008; de Raedt and Kimmig, 2015;
Tran et al., 2017; Bingham et al., 2019). This in-
cludes, e.g., the BLOG program formalizing the
radar blip example, among many others.
As in previous work (e.g., Galles and Pearl 1998;
Halpern 1998, 2000; Zhang 2013, etc.), the axiomati-
zations below in §3 factor out probabilities (in effect,
holding all probabilistic choices fixed) and focus only
on the deterministic core, as defined above in §2.1,
§2.2.
2.4 The Equivalence of Monotone
Simulations and Computable SEMs
Analogously to Defn. 7, we can assess equivalence
between between any two causal models, whether
simulations or SEMs. It turns out that the classes
T and M are equivalent in the following sense.
Theorem 1. For anyM ∈M there is a T ∈ T such
that M ≃ T and vice versa.
Proof. Let M ∈ M. Consider T ∈ T with this
pseudocode: T consists of an infinite loop calling
the following subroutine Calc(X) on every X ∈ χ.
The subroutine Calc(X) returns immediately if the
variable tape square for X isn’t blank. Otherwise it
emulates a computation of φ(X, ·) (Defn. 4) and
writes the result to the square for X . The emu-
lated input variable tape (which holds the second
argument of φ) behaves as follows on access to the
square for some variable Y . If the square for Y in
the original output variable tape (which T writes
to) is not blank, then the emulated tape holds the
value from the original tape. If it is blank, then the
simulation computes t(Y ) and t(X); if t(Y ) < t(X)
then Calc(Y ) is recursively called so that the Y -
square is no longer blank and one can proceed as
above. Otherwise, the emulated tape contains some
arbitrary value in its Y -square.
Note T is functional since the square for any X
can be written only by a call to Calc(X). Next
let us show that M ≃ T, which immediately im-
plies that T is monotone. Let i be an interven-
tion, and suppose i(M) |= v. We show by induc-
tion that i(T) |= v. The base case: a variable
X with t(X) = t0 = minX′∈χ t(X
′). If X /∈ i
then v(X) = fX(v
′) = φ(X, v′) for any input v′;
thus Calc(X) writes v(X). X ∈ i is trivial. Now
consider an X with t(X) > t0. By induction and
construction of the emulator, the value output by
Calc(X) is fX(v
′) at some v′ such that v′(Y ) =
v(Y ) for all Y such that t(Y ) < t(X). By Defn.
1, fX(v
′) = fX(v) = v(X) so we are done. An
analogous induction shows that if i(T) |= v then
i(M) |= v.
Now let T ∈ T . Define M ∈ M by giving the fol-
lowing pseudocode to compute φ(X, v): emulate the
run of i′(T), where i′ is the restriction of v to all
variables but X , until reaching a write to the emu-
lated X-square, and halt outputting this value. This
is computable in the sense of Defn. 4 since the or-
acle (Defn. 6) for i′ on X ′ can simply check that
X ′ 6= X and then look on the input variable tape
to find the required value v(X ′). If i(T) |= v, when
computing any φ(X, v) the i′ above is a restriction of
v, so i(M) |= v by functionality (Defn. 8). Consider
Lem. 1 below for the converse.
Lemma 1. Let T ∈ T , i be an intervention, and
t ∈ N. Suppose i′ is the restriction of i to those X ′
such that t(X ′) < t, with i(T) |= v and i′(T) |= v′.
Then v(X) = v′(X) for all X /∈ i with t(X) ≤ t.
Proof. Such an X is written to at some point in ex-
ecuting both i(T), i′(T) so we have finite restrictions
i 6∞, i
′
6∞ of i, i
′ such that i 6∞(T), i
′
6∞(T) write the same
value to X as do i(T), i′(T) resp. Transforming i′6∞
into i 6∞ stepwise (cf. proof of Prop. 1) by adding
one more variable Y to the domain in each step, if
v(X) 6= v′(X) then some step yields a Y such that
T |= Y  X but t(Y ) ≥ t(X).
Suppose i(M) |= v; we show i(T) |= v by induction.
The base case is again a variable X with t(X) = t0.
If X /∈ i, apply Lem. 1 choosing i′, t0 as i, t; the
restriction is empty, so the value output for X by
i′(T) agrees with that output by T, which in turn
agrees with that output by i(T) since t(X) = t0 and
X /∈ i. For the inductive case with t(X) = t > t0,
choosing i′, t in Lem. 1 and applying functionality
and composition gives that i(T) writes v(X) to its
X-square.
3 The Conditional Logic of
Open-Universe Causal Models
Thm. 1 establishes a strong equivalence between
simulation models and (computable) SEMs, showing
that they encode exactly the same underlying condi-
tional theories. In this section we offer an axiomatic
characterization of these conditional theories.
We introduce two formal languages of subjunctive
conditionals interpreted in either M or T under
their respective semantics of intervention. We then
find sound and complete axiomatizations of their
validities. For reasons of simplicity and elegance,
but not necessity, we assume a binary alphabet
Σ = {0, 1} in this section.
3.1 Syntax and Semantics
We admit the variables of χ as atoms and let Lprop
be the language of propositional formulas over these
atoms. Let Lint ⊂ Lprop be the language of purely
conjunctive, ordered formulas of literals formed from
distinct atoms. To be precise, let us call ℓ an X-
literal if ℓ ∈ {X,¬X}. Then Lint consists of for-
mulas of the form ℓ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ℓn, where each ℓi is an
Xi-literal for some distinct X1, . . . , Xn ∈ χ. Each
α ∈ Lint specifies a finite intervention by giving fixed
values for a fixed list of variables, and we also write
α for this intervention. Lint includes the empty in-
tervention ⊤ with dom(⊤) = ∅.
Let Lcond be the language of formulas of the form
[α]β for α ∈ Lint, β ∈ Lprop. We call such a formula
a subjunctive conditional, and call α the antecedent
and β the consequent. The overall conditional lan-
guage L is the language of propositional formulas
over atoms in Lcond. For α, β ∈ L, α → β abbrevi-
ates ¬α ∨ β, and α↔ β means (α→ β) ∧ (β → α).
To give the semantics of L, we first define a satis-
faction relation between solutions v : χ → Σ and
formulas of Lprop. For X ∈ χ, write v |= X iff
v(X) = 1. For arbitrary ϕ ∈ Lprop, v |= ϕ is defined
familiarly by recursion. Now we may define satis-
faction for Lcond. Let M be a model in either M
or T . Write M |= [α]β if α(M) has solution v and
v |= β. Finally, satisfaction for the entire language
L is defined by recursion.
We also consider an augmented languageL+, defined
by extending L to include additional atoms X  Y
for X,Y ∈ χ. This is interpreted as causal influence:
X  Y holds in model M if M |= X  Y (recall
Defn. 3).
Thm. 1 implies that any ϕ ∈ L+ is satisfiable in T
iff satisfiable in M. Hence any semantic property is
oblivious to the class in which to interpret it and we
omit this.
A first observation is that our language and inter-
pretations do not enjoy the property of compactness
(the property that every unsatisfiable set of formulas
has a finite unsatisfiable subset), and our axiomati-
zations are hence only complete relative to finite sets
of assumptions:
Proposition 2. The languages L,L+ are not com-
pact.
Proof. Enumerate the variables as χ = {Xi}i∈N.
Consider the set Ω = {[Xi+1]Xi ∧ [¬Xi+1]¬Xi : i ∈
N}. Every finite subset of Ω is easily seen to be sat-
isfiable. But each formula implies that Xi+1  Xi,
contradicting that t is well-founded; thus Ω is unsat-
isfiable.
3.2 Axiomatizations
We now give an axiomatization AX of the validi-
ties of L. Start with the base system AX↓det from
Ibeling and Icard (2018), obtained by the axioms
and rules:
PC. Propositional calculus
RW. From β → β′ infer [α]β → [α]β′
R. [α]α
K. [α](β → γ)→ ([α]β → [α]γ)
F/D. [α]¬β ↔ ¬[α]β
The causal axiom of effectiveness (Galles and Pearl,
1998; Halpern, 2000) is encoded by RW and R, while
F/D expresses the fact that solutions always exist
uniquely. System AX↓det, without F/D—a system
significantly weaker than any existing logic of causal
conditionals in the literature—has been shown sound
and complete with respect to the general class of sim-
ulation models, while F/D can be added to axiom-
atize those programs that are deterministic and/or
always halt (Ibeling and Icard, 2018). In the present
setting we are assuming determinism (but allowing
a natural incorporation of probability; recall §2.3).
In order to capture the logic of our restricted classes
of SEMs and simulation programs, we add two fur-
ther axioms to obtain the system AX = AX↓det +
C + Rec. Axiom C is known variously as cautious
monotonicity (Kraus et al., 1990) or composition
(Galles and Pearl, 1998; Pearl, 2009), and schema
Rec is known as recursiveness (Halpern, 1998, 2000).
C. ([α]β ∧ [α]γ)→ [α ∧ β]γ
Rec.
(
[α1 ∧X1]ℓ2 ∧ [α1 ∧ ¬X1]¬ℓ2 ∧ · · · ∧
[αk−1 ∧Xk−1]ℓk ∧ [αk−1 ∧ ¬Xk−1]¬ℓk
)
→ ¬ ([αk ∧Xk]ℓ1 ∧ [αk ∧ ¬Xk]¬ℓ1)
In Rec, each ℓi is an Xi-literal and X1 6= Xk. Note
that the axiom commonly known as reversibility is
easily derivable in AX (Galles and Pearl, 1998).
For L+, consider the additional axioms
Wit. ([α ∧X1]ℓ2 ∧ [α ∧ ¬X1]¬ℓ2)→ X1  X2
Rec+. (X1  X2 ∧ · · · ∧Xk−1  Xk)→ Xk 6 X1
Trans. (X  Y ∧ Y  Z)→ X  Z
where in Wit, ℓ2 is an X2-literal and X1 6= X2. Let
AX+ = AX+Wit+ Rec+.
We are now in a position to present our three ax-
iomatization results.
Theorem 2. AX is sound and complete with respect
to the validities of L.
Proof. By Thm. 1 it suffices to carry out the proof
for M only. Soundness is straightforward. As for
completeness, we show that any ϕ ∈ L consistent
with AX is satisfiable. Let χϕ ⊂ χ be the set of vari-
ables that appear as atoms in ϕ, let Lϕ ⊂ L be the
fragment of L using only atoms from χϕ, and extend
ϕ to a maximal consistent set Γ ⊂ Lϕ. We construct
an SEM M satisfying all of Γ, and, in particular, ϕ.
Let us first give t. Define an irreflexive relation ≺
on χϕ by X1 ≺ X2 if any instance of the schema
[α1 ∧ X1]ℓ2 ∧ [α1 ∧ ¬X1]¬ℓ2 is in Γ, where ℓ2 is an
X2-literal. By consistency with Rec there is a total
order consistent with ≺. Assign the least element
to t = 0, and iteratively remove least elements to
obtain a t injective on χϕ.
Now we may give the structural equations. Note
that for every X ∈ χϕ and α ∈ Lint ∩ Lϕ there
is exactly one formula of the form [α]ℓ, where ℓ is
an X-literal, in Γ: the forward direction of F/D
shows there is at most one, and the backward di-
rection shows there is one. Thus form a vector
vα : χ→ {0, 1} by vα(X) = 0, 1 if [α]¬X, [α]X are in
Γ respectively, and vα(X) = 0 if X /∈ χϕ. Suppose
α includes exactly the variables X ′ ∈ χϕ for which
t(X ′) < t(X). Let α, . . . represent an extension of α
to all of χ; then define fX on any such extension as
fX(α, . . . ) = vα(X). For all X /∈ χϕ, let fX(·) = 0
and t(X) = 0.
It remains to prove that M satisfies every formula
of Γ, for which it suffices to show that M |= [α]X
iff vα(X) = 1. To this effect we prove that v(X) =
vα(X), where α(M) |= v, by induction on the time
t(X). If X ∈ α then by RW,R we have v(X) =
vα(X) = α(X); thus suppose X /∈ α. Consider an
α′ that includes the value v(X ′) = vα(X
′), where
the equality holds inductively, for each X ′ ∈ χϕ such
that t(X ′) < t(X). Thus by K we have that [α]α′ ∈
Γ. Suppose that v, vα differ at X , e.g. v(X) = 0 but
vα(X) = 1. Then [α]X ∈ Γ so by C, [α ∧ α
′]X ∈ Γ.
By C and Rec we must have [α′]X ∈ Γ also. But
this term specifies fX , and hence this contradicts
that v(X) = 0.
Theorem 3. AX+ is sound and complete with re-
spect to the validities of L+.
Proof. Soundness is again straightforward; we show
a consistent ϕ ∈ L+ is satisfiable. Extend to a max-
imal consistent set Γ using only χϕ-atoms. Define a
relation ≺+ by X ≺+ Y if X  Y ∈ Γ. By consis-
tency with Rec+ we have that there is a total order
consistent with ≺+. Now, reproduce the construc-
tion from the proof of Thm. 2 on Γ. By consistency
withWit, ≺ is consistent with ≺+, so we may extend
them to the same total order, from which we obtain
t. Let M be the model thus constructed.
Now, obtain a new model M ′ by extending M as
follows. For every pair X,Y , introduce a new vari-
able ZX,Y with fZX,Y (·) = 0 and t(ZX,Y ) = 0.
It is possible to add such variables since χ is infi-
nite. Now, modify the structural functions for each
Y ∈ χϕ as follows. Labelling the variables X
′ for
which X ′ ≺+ Y as X1, . . . , Xk:
fY (v) =


fY (v), v(ZX′,Y ′) = 0 for all X
′, Y ′
X1, v(ZX1,Y ) = 1 and v(ZX′,Y ′) = 0
whenever (X ′, Y ′) 6= (X1, Y )
. . .
Xk, v(ZXk,Y ) = 1 and v(ZX′,Y ′) = 0
whenever (X ′, Y ′) 6= (Xk, Y )
0, otherwise
This modification is admissible because ≺+ is con-
sistent with t. We claim that M ′ satisfies all of
Γ. Any ψ ∈ Γ ∩ L is clearly satisfied: ψ is sat-
isfied by M and in M ′ we have v(ZX,Y ) = 0 for
all X,Y , so the structural equations are unmodified
from those of M . Thus, suppose that an extended
atom X  Y ∈ Γ. Consider an intervention α that
holds ZX,Y to 1, and holds all other ZX′,Y ′ to 0.
Then under α, we have the modified structural equa-
tion fY (v) = v(Y ) = v(X), so M
′ |= X  Y .
Now suppose X 6 Y ∈ Γ. Suppose toward a con-
tradiction that M ′ |= X  Y . Then there is an in-
tervention α under which toggling X changes Y . If
α does not set any ZX′,Y ′ -variables, then the struc-
tural equations are the same in M,M ′ and we have
that M |= [α ∧X ]ℓY ∧ [α ∧ ¬X ]¬ℓY , where ℓY is a
Y -literal, contradicting consistency with Wit. If α
sets any ZX′,Y ′ to 1 for Y
′ 6= Y , then the value of Y
is fixed to 0. The only case remaining is when only
α(ZX′,Y ) = 1 for some X
′. If X ′ = X then there
is a contradiction since the modification was only
made if X  Y ∈ Γ. Thus X ′ 6= X . The structural
equation for Y then becomes fY (v) = v(Y ) = v(X
′);
further, X ′ is fixed to 0 since v(ZX′,Y ) = 1, so this
is impossible.
Theorem 4. AX+ + Trans is sound and complete
with respect to the validities of L+ over Mlocal.
Proof. Soundness follows since causal influence in
Mlocal is transitive, as we remarked before. To show
completeness, as before, extend a given consistent
ϕ ∈ L+ to a maximal consistent set Γ, and define
≺+ by X ≺+ Y if X  Y ∈ Γ. By consistency
with Rec+,Trans, ≺+ is a strict partial order. Again
reproduce the construction from the proof of Thm.
2; by consistency with Wit, ≺ is consistent with ≺+
and we extend them to the same total order, obtain-
ing t and M .
First convert M to a model M ′ ∈ Mlocal. In
M , the structural function for a variable Y may
be written as fY (X1, . . . , Xk), where X1, . . . , Xk ∈
χϕ are precisely the variables preceding Y . To
form M ′, for each Xi that does not satisfy
t(Xi) = t(Y ) − 1, add a chain of variables
W ′Xi,t(Xi)+1, . . . ,W
′
Xi,t(Y )−1
such that t(W ′Xi,t) =
t and with structural equations v(W ′Xi,t(Xi)+1) =
v(Xi), v(W
′
Xi,t
) = v(W ′Xi,t−1) for all t(Xi) + 1 <
t < t(Y ), and change the structural function for Y to
fY (W
′
Xi,t(Y )−1
, . . . ,W ′Xi,t(Y )−1, . . . ,W
′
Xk,t(Y )−1
). It
is clear that M ′ |= ψ iff M |= ψ for any ψ ∈ L+.
Now modify M ′ to obtain a model M ′′ ∈ Mlocal
that we will show to satisfy all of Γ. To form M ′′,
for every pair X,Y such that X ≺+ Y , add a chain
WX,Y,t(X)+1, . . . ,WX,Y,t(Y )−1 and a single variable
ZX,Y . These have the times t(WX,Y,t′) = t
′, and
t(ZX,Y ) = t(Y ) − 1; and the structural equations
v(WX,Y,t(X)+1) = v(X), v(WX,Y,t′) = v(WX,Y,t′−1)
for t(X) < t′ < t(Y ), and v(ZX,Y ) = 0. Modify the
structural equation for Y as follows, labelling the
variables X ′ for which X ′ ≺+ Y as X1, . . . , Xk:
fY (v) =


fY (v), v(ZX′,Y ) = 0 for all X
′
v(WX1,Y,t(Y )−1), v(ZX1,Y ) = 1 and
v(ZX′,Y ) = 0, if X
′ 6= X1
. . .
v(WXk ,Y,t(Y )−1), v(ZXk,Y ) = 1 and
v(ZX′,Y ) = 0, if X
′ 6= Xk
0, otherwise
The modification is admissible because all variables
involved are assigned to t(Y ) − 1. We claim that
M ′′ satisfies all of Γ. Again, this holds for any L-
literal, so suppose X  Y ∈ Γ. Under an interven-
tion that holds the ZX,Y to 1, we have that v(Y ) =
v(WX,Y,t(Y )−1) = · · · = v(WX,Y,t(X)+1) = v(X) so
that M ′′ |= X  Y .
Now suppose that M ′′ |= X  Y . The intervention
witnessing this fixes either none, or one of the ZXi,Y
to 1. If it fixes none, then taking the values of all the
χϕ variables into an intervention gives a witness that
M |= X  Y , so byWit, X  Y ∈ Γ. Thus suppose
it fixes just one ZXi,Y to 1. This gives that Xi  
Y ∈ Γ, with t(X) ≤ t(Xi) < t(Y ). Now M
′′ |=
X  Xi; we thus repeat the argument obtaining a
sequence X ≺+ X ′1 ≺
+ · · · ≺+ X ′k ≺
+ Y . Since ≺+
is transitive (from Trans) we finally obtain X  Y ∈
Γ.
Proposition 3. The satisfiability problem (deter-
mining whether a formula of L/L+ has a model in
the relevant class) in all three cases (Thms. 2, 3, 4)
is NP-complete.
Proof Sketch. In each case the proof of complete-
ness produces a small model, usable as a certificate:
O(n), O(n2), O(n3) variables have to be considered
in the first, second, and third cases respectively.
3.3 Relation to Existing Work
Thm. 2 shows that the class of open-universe gen-
erative programs defined in §2.2 satisfies a natu-
ral set of axioms. In fact, the system AX encom-
passes all of the principles about counterfactual con-
ditionals used in the complete identification algo-
rithm of Shpitser and Pearl (2008). This, together
with Thm. 1, lends at least some credence to the
idea that these “merely implicit” causal models can
be understood on a par with more familiar explicit
causal representations such as SEMs.
The previous literature on causal conditionals has
explored classes of axioms and models that are quite
different from those considered here. For instance,
in addition to studying the (finite) recursive struc-
tural equation models, Halpern (1998, 2000) axiom-
atizes the class of SEMs that have a unique solution
(but may not be recursive), as well as the class of
all SEMs built of arbitrary equations, which may
in general lack solutions. Similarly, Zhang (2013)
considers classes of SEMs with desirable sets of so-
lutions. Some of the central axioms for these classes
make reference to all variables of the signature and
thus cannot be translated into the open-universe set-
ting. More fundamentally, it is not evident which of
these models have an adequate procedural interpre-
tation.
An analogous generalization in our setting might be
to consider simulation models that “crash” under
certain interventions and fail to have a solution. If
we allow φ (Defn. 4) to be only partial computable
on χ × F , the construction from Thm. 1 shows
that every partial SEM has an equivalent simulation
model in this wider class; but simple counterexam-
ples show the reverse direction does not hold. Log-
ically, only the forward direction of axiom F/D re-
mains sound, and we leave the question of axioma-
tizing this wider class for future work.
The relation has been used as a defined symbol in
previous work (e.g., Halpern 2000). Because the rel-
evant definition again relies on reference to all vari-
ables in the signature, this is not possible in the
open-universe setting. Thms. 3 and 4 are thus new
in the present work.
4 Conclusion
We have identified two equivalent classes of
models—one declarative, one procedural—
formalizing the notion of an open-universe causal
model. Both classes validate an intuitive and famil-
iar set of principles about subjunctive conditionals
and the relation of causal influence. This highlights
an important class of implicit generative models
that can plausibly be treated as genuine causal
models, on a par with (an infinitary generaliza-
tion of computable, recursive) structural equation
models. More detailed work is of course needed
to identify concrete cases in which components of
learned generative models support legitimate causal
counterfactuals (see, e.g., Besserve et al. 2018 for
progress on this question).
From an axiomatic perspective, it would be desirable
to extend the present treatment to the full prob-
abilistic setting, since, as remarked in §2.3, both
classes of models can be augmented with a natu-
ral probabilistic source. Axioms for probabilistic
formal systems are well studied (e.g., Fagin et al.
1990). In the direction of a fully formalized do-
calculus (Pearl, 2009), one would like to embed an
axiom system like AX into an appropriate proba-
bility calculus, and combine these with a logic of
direct causal influence (a direct and probabilistic
version of  ), so that the do-calculus rules could
be expressed and studied in a precise formal sys-
tem. While the basic definitions would be clear for
SEMs (and this could of course already be inves-
tigated for finite SEMs), the extension to simula-
tion programs is less clear. Existing identifiability
algorithms require specific assumptions about exoge-
nous noise variables, e.g., that each has only two en-
dogenous children (Shpitser and Pearl, 2008). Some
work would need to done to ensure that probabilis-
tic programs (or Turing machines) satisfy analogous
restrictions.
Finally, other extensions to the languages consid-
ered here would also be natural to investigate. We
studied one higher-order relation, namely  , which
involves quantification over an infinite domain (the
space of interventions). One of the advantages of
open-universe models is precisely that they enable
reasoning beyond the propositional level. Thus, e.g.,
systems for reasoning about causal and counterfac-
tual statements involving explicit quantification (as
in the examples from §1) are easily motivated, and
ought to be understood.
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